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The coronavirus pandemic, and the resulting severe economic dis-
ruptions, can only be eﬀ ectively tackled with a European and global 
response. The degree of integration and interdependence between 
member states – economically, politically and socially – means that 
in dealing with the virus and its economic eﬀ ects, the EU is only as 
strong as its weakest part. Governments have to devise a more for-
ward-looking, collective response. Hesitation and the failure to tackle 
the problem collectively will increase the losses – in terms of lives, 
economic wellbeing, political stability and EU unity. 
– The European Council video call on the coronavirus of March 10th, 
2020 was disappointing. European governments need to implement 
a coordinated health response that sets the frame for comprehen-
sive testing, quarantine, and social distancing measures in order to 
delay and minimize the spread of the virus.
– Leaders need to ensure that no health system is entirely over-
whelmed. This includes organizing shared new supply and stock and 
sharing health resources.
– An eﬀ ective economic response to the supply and demand shocks 
caused by the pandemic as well as to ﬁ nancial market turmoil 
require coordination and more ambitious EU instruments. The ECB 
could play a more central role than it has so far, but the response 
also has to be ﬁ rst of a ﬁ scal nature.
– The EU should facilitate an international response that avoids sev-
eral waves of the pandemic, limits wealth losses and supports 
the poorer countries. This, however, ﬁ rst requires a coordinated 
approach internally.
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PRIORITIES FOR 
EUROPEAN LEADERS
The COVID-19 pandemic is now spreading so rapidly 
that epidemiologists expect up to 70% of the world 
population to be affected. Figures on the mortali-
ty rate of this infection vary greatly from country to 
country as testing is not comparable (See Figure 1). 
But the rate seems to be higher than the seasonal flu 
(with an average mortality rate of about 0.1%). It is 
lower, however,  than the deadliest epidemic in his-
tory, the Spanish flu of 1918, which killed up to 100 
million globally in 15 months (with a mortality rate 
of roughly 3%). 
Governments have slowly accepted the inevitabili-
ty of the health crisis, but still seem uncertain about 
the right political and economic response. Hesita-
tion, however, greatly increases the losses. A pan-
demic of this scale, along with severe economic dis-
ruptions can only be addressed collectively. 
European governments have to tackle three si-
multaneous policy challenges both at home and 
collectively.
 
• The first and foremost task it to devise a health 
 and containment strategy that serves to slow 
 down the epidemic and avoids the implosion of 
 health systems. 
• Secondly a comprehensive economic and finan- 
 cial response to the unfolding supply and demand 
 shocks, should include forward looking flexibility 
 in order to stabilize financial markets, provide 
 liquidity to companies and to protect jobs.
• Thirdly, Europeans should take a lead in ensuring 
 dertermined international cooperation in health 
 and economic policy.
If they fail, the coronavirus will have tremendous 
health, economic and political consequences. It is not 
a given that Europe will be able to tackle the challeng-
es internally in a cooperative way. For both health and 
economic policy, there is a bad and a more optimis-
tic scenario. Which one materializes depends on major 
policy choices to be taken immediately.
FIGURE 1: COVID-19 TESTING PER CAPITA
COUNTRY/  
PROVINCE
POP. 
IN M
# CASES (AS 
OF MAR. 13)
# TESTED 
(AS OF)
TESTS PER MILLION PEOPLE
Germany 82.8  3,117  N/A  N/A
Spain 46.7  4,073  N/A  N/A
US* 329  1,832 1,707 (Mar. 8) 5
Japan 127  701 8,411 (Mar. 4)   66
France 65.2  2,876  11,895 (Mar. 5)       182
UK 67.8  609 23,513 (Mar. 8) 347
Netherlands 17.1  428 6,000 (Mar. 7) 350
Israel 8.6  126 3,451 (Mar. 8) 401
Italy 60.5  15,113 49,937 (Mar. 8) 826
Guangdong, 
China
113.5  80,815 320,000 (Feb. 28) 2,820
South Korea 51.3  7,979 189,236 (Mar. 8) 3,692
* Based on CDC and does not include accurate test counts performed at state, local, private, and commercial labs.
US Census Bureau, World Population Review, CDC, FDA, KCDC, UK Dept. of Health and Social Care, Italian Ministry of Health, Japan Ministry of Health, 
Labour, and Welfare, Netherlands National Institute for Public Health and the Environment, WHO  |  Worldometers.info  |  March 2020
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CONTAINING THE EPIDEMIC 
AND PROVIDING HEALTH 
CARE TO THE ILL
The World Health Organisation (WHO) has so far man-
aged to provide relevant guidance on suitable contain-
ment measures. But Europe is lagging behind in the 
implementation of these measures. Italy stood out ear-
ly as a strongly infected country, which may be the re-
sult of a bias because it has conducted far more testing 
than the rest of Europe as Figure 1 illustrates. Observ-
ing the case, some governments may – at least tempo-
rarily – have decided to hide behind the appearance of 
lower levels of infections to delay action and European 
cooperation. Others may simply have underestimated 
the scale and scope of the pandemic.
The Council meeting of Health Ministers on March 6th, 
2020 did not come up with a sufficient joint response. 
The fact that some member states maintained nation-
al export bans on medical devices such as protective 
masks shows that, as soon as the coronavirus spreads, 
governments opt to protect their own citizens over Eu-
ropean solidarity. Politically, this sends a dangerous 
message and is very reminiscent of the early days of 
the euro crisis where national responses to save banks 
ended up fuelling rather than containing contagion.  
The European Council video call on March 10th, 2020 
meanwhile agreed to exchange relevant information 
to help limit the spread of the virus, work on the pro-
vision of medical equipment and promote research, 
including for a vaccine, but failed to take a common 
line on testing, containment, quarantine and social 
distancing across the EU. 
Scenario 1:  
Lack of political coordination, prolonged crisis
There are two scenarios going ahead. In a bad scenario 
different levels of testing, differing degrees of transpar-
ency around the number of cases and varying contain-
ment strategies provoke an intensification of the health 
crisis. In some member states, public authorities pre-
fer to delay aggressive containment and social distanc-
ing measures and hoard medical supplies until they see 
enough cases at home. By the time cases are known 
and documented, it might be too late for more aggres-
sive containment measures to stem the epidemic.
This disjointed approach increases the chance that 
national health system cannot cope with the load, as 
is the case in certain regions of Italy. If medical care 
How leaders can stop corona from undermining the EU
cannot be provided, this will unnecessarily increase 
the death toll, prolong the health crisis and may 
undermine political stability. As the case of Hungary 
shows, some leaders may use the health emergency 
to fasten their authoritarian grip of power. Other, 
like Italy, perceive a striking lack of European so-
lidarity with possibly lasting effects on public 
opinion and trust levels. Countries whose 
authorities have been the slowest to respond will be 
more impacted for longer they risk spreading the 
virus back to those who have taken appropriate 
steps early. As a consequence, more borders may be 
pulled up, also within the EU. An uncoordinated 
approach increases the chances that the pandemic 
will come in several waves and that it will cause 
more substantial health damage and economic 
disruptions (see below).
Scenario 2:  
A cooperative handling of the health emergency
It is therefore urgent that the EU aims for a second 
scenario and immediately comes up with a common 
approach to testing, social distancing measures and 
quarantine, which remain the most effective way to 
slow down the spread of the epidemic (see Figure 2), 
avoid resurgent waves caused by an excessively rapid 
lifting of containment measures and protect national 
health systems from reaching saturation point. A 
European framework would help governments as 
well as regional and local authorities to come to grips 
with the risks on the horizon and to take bold and in 
part unpopular measures early on, rather than 
waiting for the pandemic to visibly spread.
As it is politically difficult to lift export bans on ur-
gently needed health equipment like face masks 
and respiratory aid devices unless countries 
have full stocks in a damage control phase, a joint 
procurement and distribution mechanism based on 
a defined set of criteria, for instance for imports 
from China, should be established. By organizing 
such imports collectively, the risk of increasing 
political dependencies with countries that are in a 
fragile situation is reduced. 
Achieving this coordinated response in 27 countries 
and protecting more than 500 million people would 
help strengthen Europe’s coordination ability in the 
economic realm, too. It is unlikely that we will see a 
fully coordinated economic and financial response, if 
we don’t share the sense of a common health threat 
and a common health response and prove that the 
EU upholds it’s underlying principles and values even 
How leaders can stop corona from undermining the EU
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FIGURE 2: LOWER AND DELAY THE EPIDEMIC PEAK
#
 o
f 
ca
se
s
time since ﬁ rst case
healthcare 
system 
capacity 
(ICUs, ER 
visits, etc.)
Source: CC BY 2.0 Esther Kim @K_thos
Carl T. Bergstrom @ CT_Bergstrom  |  2020
control measures slow the spread of disease and 
reduce burden on hospitals
with controlsuncontrolled 
transmission
handwashing teleworking limiting large 
gatherings
minimizing 
travel
in times of unprecdented challenges. Such a response 
would also demonstrate to the rest of the world 
that international coordination can be achieved. 
This requires understanding that, just like when 
crises hit the euro area, Europe is as weak as its 
weakest part: If one European country is 
submerged by the pandemic and its health 
system is unable to cope, it maximizes the 
chance of a spread to other European countries. 
The decision by the Italian government to impose 
severe containment measures on the entire 
population is commensurate with the strength of 
its health system and is appropriate. It should in 
fact be politically supported and matched in the 
rest of Europe not only out of solidarity, but out 
of self-interest. 
STABILIZING THE EUROPEAN 
ECONOMY AND CONTAINING 
MARKET PANIC
Second, the economic and fi nancial shock cannot be 
addressed by member states alone. Recent market 
turbulence was initially caused by concerns about the 
spreading virus contagion and resulting value chain 
disruptions, but now containment measures will also 
have a profound and lasting economic effect. 
Political leaders have so far left fi nancial actors in 
uncertainty. The G7 has only released a timid com-
munique. The 24 Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
governors representing the IMFC members held a 
conference call on March 4th, 2020, but stayed shy 
of issuing a joint statement. The European Coun-
cil convened on March 10th, 2020 agreed virtually 
nothing concrete on the economic response other 
than a vague promise to coordinate. The European 
Commission’s announcement for a Coronavirus In-
vestment fund of EUR 25bn is an order of magni-
tude too small to matter. The US, which used to be 
an anchor of international crisis management, has 
meanwhile become a drop-out. The Trump admin-
istration initially treated the pandemic as a poten-
tial hoax and may now need to acknowledge that its 
health system is profoundly unable to cope with an 
epidemic of this nature. The consequence is likely to 
be an inward-looking US administration, something 
that is particularly harmful for an effective handling 
of the economic and fi nancial repercussions of the 
crisis. The recent decision to ban fl ights to and from 
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the Schengen area is a testament to the potential re-
trenchment that we will likely see more of. 
Scenario 1:  
Economic crisis, single market disintegration, 
financial melt down
In a bad case scenario, the current lack of a forceful 
and coordinated political response to the econom-
ic repercussions will provoke more financial conta-
gion. Since the Coronavirus emerged in China at the 
end of last year, the economic effects have spilt into 
Europe, first by a disruption of supply chains. Right 
now, European economies face a supply side shock 
as factories close down and people go on sick leave. 
This is now compounded by a demand side shock as 
containment, quarantine and social distancing cause 
a drop in travel, tourism and consumption across the 
board. Finally, financial market distress is fuelling a 
confidence shock that affects investment decisions 
and credit availability. 
Given the absence of concerted action, Europe-
an countries could take aggressive decisions to lim-
it their own economic loss, ration certain products – 
as is already being done for certain pieces of health 
equipment – and close down internal borders not 
only for individuals but also for goods. Travel restric-
tions between EU countries based on uncoordinat-
ed assessments of the actual health risks hamper the 
free movement of people, goods and services, which 
in turn undermines the functioning of the single 
market and weighs on companies that have assumed 
the four freedoms of the single market as a given. 
Some may decide to limit their fiscal response to try-
ing to adhere to the Stability and Growth Pact and 
avoiding financial distress on the government bond 
markets. Others could decide to lift prudential mea-
sures and capital adequacy rules that the European 
regulator has imposed on European banks. This break-
down in coordination would mean a deeper econom-
ic shock, a certain and protracted recession, fuelling 
disintegration of the single market and potentially de-
stabilizing our economy and financial system durably.
As a result, and because of the potentially inadequate 
economic policy response, a fully-fledged self-fulfill-
ing crisis could develop. Ripple effects can already be 
seen in certain subsets of the financial sector. In the 
oil market, Saudi Arabia and Russia are using this cri-
sis to start a war for market share inside OPEC risk-
ing a real collapse in oil prices. American oil compa-
nies may be heavily affected; highly leveraged energy 
producers are risking bankruptcy by the dozens. This 
could send financial markets into a tailspin. 
At a moment of global vulnerability, the unpredict-
able Trump administration could further aggravate 
the situation, namely by challenging the US dollar li-
quidity provision via the Federal Reserve internation-
al swap line network which is central for global fi-
nancial stability. Dollar liquidity shortages may cause 
financial markets to break.
Scenario 2:  
Cooperative and flexible crisis management, 
new impulse for completing eurozone
But the worst is not inevitable, European policy mak-
ers could draw both the lesson from aggressive con-
tainment measures taken in the recent crises in the 
financial markets and the euro area and acknowledge 
that measures taken individually by governments 
may not only increase contagion and distress, but 
can actually undermine the governance set-up of the 
euro area causing lasting harm. They may go even 
further, as has happened in the previous crises in the 
The Corona Response Investment Initiative 
is designed to support SMEs, health care 
systems, labor markets and other vulnera-
ble parts of the economy. 
In order to rapidly mobilize EUR 25bn of 
European public investment to cope with the 
consequences of the crisis, the Commission 
will propose to waive this year the obligation 
to request repayment of unspent pre-financ-
ing for European Structural and Investment 
Funds currently held by member states. 
The member states will be obliged to use 
these amounts to accelerate their invest-
ments under the Structural Funds. This will 
be used for national co-financing they would 
normally have had to provide themselves 
to receive the next tranches of their struc-
tural fund envelopes. Given the average 
co-financing rates in the member states, the 
EUR 7.5 bn can trigger the release and use 
of some EUR 17.5 - 18 bn of Structural Funds 
across the EU.
How leaders can stop corona from undermining the EU
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eurozone, namely that crisis management went hand 
in hand with a strengthening of the institutional set-
up of the currency union.
In this scenario, governments opt for collective ac-
tion. They can start by building on the Corona Re-
sponse Investment Initiative (see box), but increase 
the scope, and propose a common framework across 
EU countries that could include, for instance, house-
hold and corporate tax relief, social contribution 
cuts for workers, mandatory paid leave, paid partial 
unemployment and credit/mortgage holidays. 
They could also provide larger amounts of lending 
through the European Investment Bank, in partic-
ular to those countries that do not have their own 
promotional bank like the Kreditanstalt für Wieder-
aufbau (KfW) in Germany and Caisse des Dépôts in 
France. Such support should go in particular to those 
countries with limited fiscal space or poorly capital-
ized banking systems. 
Moreover, governments agree to apply the flexibility 
that the European fiscal framework allows in excep-
tional circumstances outside of member states’ con-
trol. These should be invoked at the next Eurogroup 
meeting and guidelines should be offered as to the 
fiscal measures as well extraordinary spending and 
stipends to counter the supply and demand blow. 
The European Central Bank, in this better scenario, 
plays a decisive role as well on three fronts:
• ensuring financial stability and the well-function- 
 ing of markets, 
• loosening monetary to support the private sector 
 and enable fiscal policy to play its rol in full 
• securing the best possible level of international 
 cooperation.  
Financial stability can be achieved by target as-
set purchases and long-term refinancing opera-
tions.  Monetary policy needs to allow governments 
to meet their financing needs and expand fiscal pol-
icy. To this effect, the ECB could expand the current 
PSPP programme and ensure that government bond 
spreads do not limit the ambitious and collective fis-
cal response it is calling for. This might require the 
use of precautionary lending programmes by the 
ESM combined with OMT if necessary. Finally, the 
ECB must be at the forefront of international efforts 
for coordination between central banks to guaran-
tee financial stability and liquidity provision, which 
the new ECB President is probably the best possible 
person to undertake given her experience at the IMF.
The EU should also try to mobilize its own resourc-
es and use existing instruments that can be used to 
allay economic shocks. Many workers will be forced 
into a temporary/partial unemployment and these 
could be in part financed via a European vehicle, 
which could form the prelude for a future European 
unemployment insurance scheme. If the EU achieves 
this level of coordination, it will not only successfully 
minimize the economic damage, it will also help limit 
the hysteresis effect of this crisis and accelerate the 
ensuing recovery.
The coronavirus crisis is a large-scale stress test to 
the eurozone and the single market. In the best-case 
scenario, political leaders not only handle the crisis 
well, but use the momentum to further much need-
ed steps of deepening. This includes the completion 
of Banking Union and moving ahead with the Capital 
Markets Union. Indeed, the way the coronavirus cri-
sis plays out in financial markets and national bank-
ing sectors is a strong case in point that lasting na-
tional divisions are harmful to the proper functioning 
and crisis responsiveness of the euro area and the 
EU. A strong political message of both European sol-
idarity and strong national interest to act in a Eu-
ropean way needs to accompany crisis management. 
ADVANCING GLOBAL 
COOPERATION
Europe has a tremendous role to play on the continent 
as well as internationally to ensure that the spread 
of the disease is as limited as possible and to mini-
mize the economic fallouts. At the moment, China and 
Corona is a large- 
scale stress test to  
the eurozone and the  
single market
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South Korea are becoming far better models to follow 
but they do not have the ability to lobby for interna-
tional action. If and when Europe sorts out a common 
approach and response, it needs to live up to its glob-
al responsibility and play an active role in achieving a 
global solution on both the health and economic front. 
The EU should also live up to its international respon-
sibility in limiting the spread of the disease in develop-
ing countries and limiting the risks of important eco-
nomic or financial fallouts for the rest of the world. 
On the health front, this may require sending ad-
vance teams of doctors to affected countries in the 
global south to ensure adequate testing, training and 
social distancing.
On the economic front, the IMFC, the G20 and G7 
are the right fora for Europe to lobby for a more co-
ordinated response economically as soon as it has 
devised its own. But it will prove difficult, because 
Saudi Arabia chairs the G20 and is currently engaged 
in a price/market war with the OPEC. Meanwhile, 
the US chairs the G7 and has shown with its unilat-
eral travel ban to and from the EU, that it was ne-
glecting international cooperation, including with its 
allies. The absence of international economic coop-
eration could limit the fiscal and monetary expansion 
of certain countries out of fear of free riding by the 
others and cooperation breakdown could make eco-
nomic fallouts far worse.
The London G20 in February 2009 is probably the 
last thing that comes to mind as an exercise in inter-
national economic policy coordination. Yet, it played 
a vital role in organizing the response to the global 
financial crisis. 
This time the virus is not of a financial origin, but it 
needs to be fought with the same intensity because it 
can have even worse effects. It is time to see if Europe 
has learned anything from the global financial cri-
sis, the euro crisis and whether it can exert sufficient 
leadership on the global stage. Bilateral actions, possi-
bly first with China given its successful experience in 
containing the virus, could be an important first step.
Regarding financial stability, the ECB has a particu-
lar role to play both in reassuring the world that it 
will live up to its responsibility as the issuer of a cur-
rency that is widely used internationally and that it 
stands ready to provide liquidity to its partners via 
the agreed FX swap arrangements. This commitment 
would reinforce the long term standing of the euro’s 
international status. And it should maintain a close 
dialogue with the leading central banks, in particu-
lar the Federal Reserve as well as the Central Banks 
of China, Japan and the UK to ensure the highest lev-
el of coordination and the unwavering commitment 
of all parties, in particular the US, to sustain the ex-
isting FX swap line network.
Europe is currently a laggard when it comes to the 
health and economic response to this epidemic. It 
has a long way to go but must get ahead of the crisis 
now and help coordinate a global response.
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